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INTRODUCTION
During the last 12 years the United States and the Soviet Union have
been engaged in cold war. Cold war is the term adopted shortly after World
War 11 to describe the intense hostile rivalry which burst into life between
the United States and the Soviet Union immediately after they had gained
military victory over Germany and Japan. Each blames the other for
starting the cold war. Each blames the other for continuing it. Each has
sought to win the advantage over the other in it. Meanwhile the cold war
goes on, with each side offering to call a halt only on terms which it
knows the other will not accept.
It is not the purpose of this pamphlet to determine which side bears
the major responsibility for starting the cold war, nor even for continuing
it. Each side has its "war partyr1 and each side its llpeace party. l t To
assess credit or blame accurately is difficult, for we a r e all involved in
the history of our times, and it is not easy to be objective and detached.
But this does not mean that we must live in a state of suspended judgment until a reliable history of this period has been written. The crises
of these times will not wait. It is a duty and a necessity to take stock of
ourselves now and to see whether the course which we a r e following is
gettinguswherewewant to go. It is the purpose of this pamphlet to assess,
the results of 12 years of cold war with the interests and the purposes,
the principles and aspirations, of organized labor particularly in mind.
During the last 75 years the rise of the American labor movement has
been a momentous fact. Labor has fought for a share in the rising national
prosperity. Labor has won the legal right to organize and to bargain collectively. Labor's days of struggle have led to periods of substantial
growth and massive institutional development.
Today America is a world power and must play a role of responsibility

in world affairs. A great d&l depends upon the spirit and the character
of that participation. As in domestic affairs, so in the foreign policies
of our nation, the conscience and the wisest understanding of our true
interests as a people must speak out of the mind and heart of America's
democratic institutions, including the trade unions.
These a r e some of the questions with which we shall deal:

1. Has the cause of labor been strengthened by the cold war?
2. Has the cold war strengthened our domestic economy ?
3. Has the cold war strengthened u s a s a nation and made us more
secure?
4. Has the cold war aided our efforts to promote world economic
development ?
5. Should labor support a new foreign policy?
These questions a r e certain to excite controversy and debate. But that
is all the more reason why the issues must be discussed. Our world is
too volatile and the price of error is too high to take anything for granted.
Noble intentions a r e not a safeguard. It is theresults that count, and after
12 years of cold war it is time for us to take stock.

THE COLD WAR AND THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY
Has the cold war strengthened our domestic economy? Has the wellbeing of labor been advanced here at home?

During the New Deal days of the 193OTs,the role of the government in
industrial relations was radically altered, and the right of the working
people to join, form, and assist unions, and to bargain collectively through
agents of their own choosing was established in law. Industry could no
longer use industrial spies nor engage in acts of intimidatibn and discrimination against union members. New legislation and new administrative
agencies assured workers of legal protection against unfair labor practices. The rule of the ballot box began to supplant the rule of tooth and
claw in industrial life. Working people were granted the right of group
representation which other elements in society had long enjoyed.
The forward motion of the New Deal was brought to a sharp halt when
World War II swept over the United States at Pearl Harbor. As President
Roosevelt put it, Dr. New Deal stepped aside in favor of Dr. Win-theWar. Tax concessions and profit guarantees were granted to industry in
order to assure armaments production. Government boards took control
of the market place and the bargaining table in setting prices, wages, and
the other conditions of economic life. Under the pressure of winning the
war labor was accorded the form, and at times the fact, of unprecedented
opportunity and power. Union leaders headed important government
bureaus, plants which had resisted unionism for years signed contracts,
employers accepted labor participation in productivity and manpower
decisions which had long been the exclusive prerogatives of management.
Many labor leaders thought that with the end of the war a return to Dr.
New Deal would occur and the gains of the war years would be carried
over into the peacetime economy. They expected the advance of democracy in industry to take up where it had left off when war began. They
also thought that a return to a peacetime economy would quickly follow
Japanese surrenaer. But instead of an economy of peace we have had an
economy of cold war. Peacetime expenditures on arms have set new
records. Emergency war measures have become normal peacetime
practices. For more than 12years the coldwar has been the largest single
economic fact of our lives. We a r e spending better than 70 per cent of
our entire national budget on arms and armies, past, present, and future.
A tenth of all the goods and services we produce a r e goods and services
directly involved in military preparations A much larger percentage is
indirectly involved.

.

THE ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GARRISON STATE
Much of the misunderstanding of the economic impact of the cold war
period is due to the enormous changes which have taken place inweaponry
and in the roles of the United States and the Soviet Union in world affairs.

Many Americans still think of the post- World War I1 period in post- World
War I terms. An article by the management consultant, Peter F. Drucker,
in the January-March 1959 issue of The General Electric Defense Quarterly
seeks to correct this. He says that the following aspects of modern armaments production a r e the "new realities1' of defense organization:
a. The specialized nature of present defense production. In World War
I 80 per cent or more of the material equipment of armies consisted
of standard peacetime goods produced in ordinary peacetime factories. Today, according to Drucker, 90 per cent of the material
needs of the military consists of special-purpose equipment which
cannot be produced except in special facilities, built for specific
military purposes and usable for little else.
b. New defense technology is based on the very rapid obsolescence of
existing weapons. Today a new weapon is likely to be obsolete by the
time it reaches the production stage. Military strength rests not on
the capacity to produce mountains of weapons that already exist, but
on the ability to design and plan the production of weapons which do
not yet exist.
c. Military production has become permanent rather than temporary,
and normal rather than emergency. The present military structure
requires permanent diversion in peacetime of a large share of the
countryfs productive resources to military production.
NEW ECONOMIC REALITIES CONFRONTING LABOR
These "new realitiesT1play a large and significant role in the economy
a s a whole.
Industry is relying more heavily on government military business than
it ever has before in the time of peace. The sheer volume of military
business is staggering. Since the end of World War 11, U. S. military
expenditures have exceeded $450 billion. At the present time these expenditures a r e over $45 billion each year. According to former Secretary
for Air, Thomas K. Finletter, the air force has become "the world's
biggest business." Its assets a r e larger than the combined resources of
General Motors, A. T. & T. , ,Standard Oil of New Jersey, General Electric, and U. S. Steel. The total value of the property of the Department of
Defense throughout the world is estimated at approximately $150 billion.
Never before have governmental expenditures in peacetime approached
present outlays for arms. According to Prof. J. K. Galbraith, "Even at
their post-war low in fiscal 1948, military outlays were greater than all
federal spending in the pumppriming days of the New Deal. "
In 1951 the United Nations Economic Survey of Europe predicted that
the defense expenditures of the Soviet Union and the United States taken
together would soon equal or even exceed the aggregate national incomes
of all the underdeveloped countries of the world. In 1957 a study document
prepared under the direction of a special committee of the U. S. Senate
estimated that the living standards of the underdeveloped areas of Asia
(excluding China), the Near East, and Africa could be raised three or
four per cent each year with an outlay of $3 billion of outside capital annually. The United States is spending 15 times that amount each year on
arms.
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These enormous outlays represent a major source of business for key
industries and industrial areas of the United States. In a year-end report
on the aircraft industry, President Dewitt C. Ramsey, of the Aircraft
Industries Association, said on December 26, 1955, that the aircraft industry had become the nation's second largest employer with an average
work force of 750,000. The report went on to say that between 85 and 90
per cent of the industry's business was derived from military contracts.
Defense business is concentrated. The big companies get the lion's
share. A report of the Senate Armed Services Committee in October,
1955, listed the 100 largest defense contractors for the period from July,
1950, through the end of 1954. These 100 companies received 63.3 per
cent of the total defense business awarded by the Defense Department, a
total of $62,767,600,000. Heading the list was General Motors with a
total of $6.66 billion. General Electric came fourth with $4.33 billion.
General Dynamics had $3.5 billion, American Telephone and Telegraph
Company had $2.25 billion, Chrysler Corporation had $2.1 billion, and
Ford Motor Company had $2.08 billion. Of the first 17 companies on the
list, 11 were aircraft companies with a total 'of $33.5 billion distributed
among them. The second largest aircraft participant, United Aircraft
Corporation, reported in March, 1958, that it finished 1957 with nearly
$2 billion in unfilled government orders a s compared with $2.3 billion
for the previous year.
These companies consume much of the country's basic metals and
electronic equipment. They and their suppliers represent the core of U. S.
industrial life. The vast proliferation of service and subsidiary occupations
and activities which make up the bulk of American commercial life a r e
directly dependent upon the economic health of these industrial giants.
The degree to which a typical company is dependent in turn, upon military
contracts is indicated by an article in Fortune of February, 1959, in which
President Frank Pace of General Dynamics is quoted as saying that the
vast industrial complex over which he presides relies on government
military contracts for 90 per cent of its entire production.
These giant enterprises do not fail to influence the people whom they
employ and the communities in which their operations are located. As
they rely on military contracts for their business and commercial life
blood, they commit communities and entire regional areas to a dependence
upon armaments production. Such cities as Seattle, Wash. , Wichita, Kan. ,
and Schenectady , N. Y. , and such areas a s Southern Michigan and Southern
California would become economic disaster areas if peace suddenly "broke
outT1
and a rapid andunplanned reduction of armaments production followed.

In his analysis of modern weapons production, Peter Drucker warns
against encouraging6'the growth of a substantial number of businesses which
have no other business than defense production, " and allowinguthe development of 'defense production regions' in which defense business is the mainstay of the regional economy. " But he does 'not tell us how this is to be
avoided (indeed, we are already in the midst of it) since he assumes that
the dynamics of cold war will continue to operate during the next decade a8
they have during the one just ending.

This new dependence of the national peacetime economy upon military
expenditures has had its effect upon the nature of the management and control of basic industries. The changes brought about are of the greatest
importance to the wage earners who comprise the membership of the powerful trade unions in steel, aircraft, automobile, electronics, communications, and oil.
A most significant development, which has as yet received only slight
attention from Congress o r the press has to do with the wide influx of high
ranking military men into the upper echelons of the management structure
of defense industries, Care has not been taken to camouflage efforts of
some armaments companies to recruit retiring admirals and generals.
North American Aviation, Inc. , for instance, a company which stood in
sixth place on the list of 100 largest defense contractors referred to above,
having had $3.6 billion in military orders over a three and a half year
period, once ran an advertisement in The Wall Street Journal offerkg a
job a s "military advisor" to an officer "with the rank of Air Force colonel, Navy captain, o r higher.
The ad specified that "experience on the
joint staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is desirable. " ANorthAmericanofficial subsequentlytestified before a congressional committee that 70 high
ranking officers replied to the ad.
The list of former military men of high rank who since retirement
have been employed by companies engaged in war production i s both long
and distinguished. Among them are:
General Omar N. Bradley, Bulova Watch
Lieutenant General Levin H. Campbell, International Harvester
General Lucius D. Clay, Continental Can
Lieutenant General Leslie Groves, Sperry Rand
General Douglas MacArthur, Sperry Rand
Major General Joseph T. McNarney, General Dynamics
Lieutenant General I r a C Eaker , Hughes Tool
General Jacob L. Devers, Fairchild Engine and Airplane
Admiral Ben Morrell, Jones & Laughlin Steel
Major General Edward M. Power, Curtiss Wright
General Walter Bedell Smith, American Machine and Foundry
General B. W. Chidlaw, Thompson Products
General Matthew B. Ridgway, Mellon Research
Rear Admiral Lawrence B. Richardson, General Dynamics
Rear Admiral Malcolm B. Schoeffel, General Precision Equipment
Admiral Robert Carney, Westinghouse Electric
Major General Harry C. Ingles, Radio Corporation of America
Major General Frederick M. Hopkins, Cleveland Pneumatic Tool
General A. C, Wedemeyer, Rheem Manufacturing
Lieutenant General Clarence S. Irvine, Avco Manufacturing

.,

The above list includes the commanding general of the allied ground
forces in Europe, a former chief of ordnance, aforrner military governor
in Germany, the former head of the Manhattan Project which produced the
first A-bombs, the allied commander-in-chief in the Pacific theater, a
former under-secretary of state, a former commander of U. N. forces in

the Korean War, a former chief of naval operations, a former chief signal
officer of the army, and a former a i r force deputy chief of staff.
At a recent hearing of the House Armed Services Subcommittee, Senator Paul He Douglas testified that a study conducted by him revealed that
769 retired military men with the rank of colonel or higher a r e on the payrolls of 88 corporations getting militaryorders fromthe government. According to Senator Douglas the companies carrying these 769 former offic e r s on their payrolls get three-fourths of the government's military procurement business. Senator Douglas's list was admittedly incomplete since
he did not succeed in getting the names of ex-officers employed by General
Motors, Pan American Airways, and the Standard Oil Companies of New
Jersey and of California.
Many of the larger armaments producers employ whole batteries of
former military men including ex-generals and ex-admirals. Lockheed
Aircraft has 20 ex-admirals and 2 ex-generals, General Dynamics has 17
ex-admirals and 7 ex-generals, Westinghouse Airbrake has 39 former officers, General Electric has 35, Westinghouse Electric has 33, Boeing Aircraft has 30, General Tire has 28, and North American Aviation has 27.
These officers draw their government pensions in addition to their industrial salaries. Menof five-star rank a r e kept on full military pay of about
$20,000 per year and get their industrial salaries as well. In some instances salaries exceed $100,000 per year.
The role of these ex-military men in the upper echelons of giant armaments companies has become a matter of public concern since very few
military contracts are awarded on a competitive basis, and most of them
do not specify a fixed price, but are "cost-plus. " This means that the
pressure is off a contractor to keep costs down, for the higher the costs
go the higher will be the yield from guaranteed ucost-plus" profit margins. In January, 1956, Chairman Carl Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee disclosed that from January, 1953, to June, 1955, 94
per cent of the $36.33 billion in defense contracts were negotiated secretly
rather than awarded by competitive bidding. Senator Douglas stated on the
floor of the Senate on July 1, 1957, that the percentage of negotiated contracts was 92 per cent for the period from January 1through September
30, 1956. More recent estimates have placed the current dollar volume of
negotiated contracts at 86 per cent of the total defense expenditures. These
same estimates place the cost-plus fee contracts at 94 per cent of the
total.
This influx of high-ranking military men into the ranks of industrial
management at a time when vast streams of public money are being poured
into the treasuries of the companies over which they preside ought to be
examined. The public interest is involved, especially since the governme nt's representative s in defense contract negotiations are usually men of
the Pentagon who will also one day retire and become available for high
salaried jobs in private industry. Even with the most rigid standards of
personal integrity, this situation would create conflict of interest problems.
Brief hearings have been held by a subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee inquiring into the relationships between ex-generals

and ex-admirals of industry and the Pentagon procurement officers with
whom their companies deal.
Such an esteemed figure as General Omar N. Bradley, himself an industrial board chairman with a $75,000 yearly salary from private industry, in addition to his $20,000 military pay, testified that he had never attempted to obtain a contract from the Defense Department, but he thought
that remedial legislation probably was needed to cover cases where "a high
sense of ethics" is not beingobserved. Vice-Admiral Hyman G.Rickover,
the Navy's nuclear power expert, went further. He stated that he had been
subjected to pressure by retired military officers seeking military contracts for private companies. At the insistence of the subcommittee chairman, Rep. F. Edward Hebert, Rickover supplied names which were kept
secret. He did not specify publicly the kinds of pressure applied.
A high official of Martin Aircraft Company told the subcommittee how
his company has flown high military officers to a country club in the Bahamas for week-end parties at company expense. He said that these trips
brought Martin officials into "closer relationships" with military officers,
and he said that "all business is done on close personal contacts. "
Actually it would be strange if under the circumstances there were
not cases of failure, as General Bradley put it, to observe "a high sense
of ethics. " The rewards a r e astronomical and the personal risk i s nonexistent. At the famous court-martial of Col. John Nickerson, growing
out of his charges that the Defense Department is riddled with lobbyists,
he testified that "high-ranking officers of the Air Force, includinggeneral
officers, got to thinking about retirement and a job as head of missile research with Lockheed o r some other firm.. Eighty-five per cent of the
aircraft sales a r e with the government. These firms put pressure on Secretary Wilson through the joint chiefs of staff, through Congress, and
through direct contacts by representatives of ihe aircraft industry with all
levels of the Pentagon. "

..

The day after Col. Nickerson gave this s e n s a t i ~ n atestimony
l
he was
taken off the witness stand and the court-martial was abruptly brought to
an end.
A fuller and no doubt a more balanced picture of the relationship between the Pentagon and defense contractors is supplied by the previously
mentioned Fortune article on General Dynamics. It carried the eyebrowraising title " General Dynamics vs. the USSR. " According to this article,
General Dynamics Company, under the leadership of its president, Frank
Pace, Jr. , has in five years seen its stock soar in value from $40 a share
to five times a s much, considering splits and dividends. Eighty-five per
cent of its business is military. Its largest division is Convair which has
produced the Atlas missile, the B-58 supersonic jet bomber, the F-106 jet
interceptor plane, and is working now on Wizard, an anti-missile missile.

i

Frank Pace, himself a Pentagon product, having been Secretary of
the Army under President Truman, presides over an industrial empire
which has 54 retired military officers on its payroll including 17 ex-admirals and 7 ex-generals.

The interesting and revealing things is Fortune's description of the
operational relationship between General Dynamics and the military wing
of the government. No longer does the government go to industry and place
orders for certain types of weapons. The whole science of weaponry today is s o technological that the military really has only a foggy idea of what
weapons it may need. Left to their own resources, the generals and the
admirals would probably continue to order more ofwhat they already have
and hope for the best.
General Dynamics' alternative to this horse-and-buggy approach is to
tackle the problem of military weapons needs from the ground up. They
start with a thorougb analysis of all technological and operational factors
and develop entire weapons systems in a single, coordinated effort. This
requires a small army of researchers and scientists employed by the company. Of General Dynamics' 92,000 employees, 22,000 a r e in engineering, scientific, and technical categories.
This weapons system approach involves three main steps:
(1)General Dynamics decides what kind of weapons systems the government needs.

(2) It educates Pentagon representatives so that they may understand what
their future needs will be.
(3)It accepts the Pentagon's contract to develop and produce the new

weapons systems which their research staffs have conceptualized.
General Dynamics' John Naish, in charge of the Convair Division, is
quoted as saying regarding the development of the B-58 supersonic bomber,
"First we had to dream it up, then sell it, thenoperate a Poor Man's State
Department to get the cooperation of other contractors. "
The weapons system approach requires basic and applied research not
only in technology but also in the entire field of military operations. Enemy
capabilities must be studied and analyzed, future wars must be visualized,
and new methods must be developed to fight them. Bright young men a r e
employed to make theoretical analyses of problems raised by possible wars
of different types, from all-out holocausts to limited wars, brush-fire
wars, and on-again off-again wars of the Quemoy type, At the same time
the physical and psychological human capacity to stand up to the s t r e s s and
strainof supersonic speeds, and gravity-free outer space travel, is tested.
This type of sociological and psychological research produces concepts
about wars and weapons which determine the nature of the weapons systems
around which American industry and American foreign policy a r e now organized. Fairly understood, the relationship between the men of the Pentagon and those ex-generals and ex-admirals who now hold positions of high
responsibility in the munitions firms, takes on quite a different character
from the two-dimensional picture suggested merely by listing the names
of ex-officers working in industry, and describing profits from "costplus, " negotiated contracts , and large salaries. Those things a r e merely
incidentals. The fact ia that the nature of modern weapons production is

such that even if all the ex-generals worked incognito, without pay, and
had no contact with their former Pentagon colleagues, the Pentagon officials responsible for armaments procurement would still be forced to rely on companies like General Dynamics, not only for their weapons, but
also for knowledge of what kind of weapow they need, how much they will
cost, and how long it will take to get them. The military tie binding the
men on both sides of the table in contract negotiations sessions may wrongfully influence, in some instances, the allocationof a contract o r the amount
the government must pay. Butthemorealarmingfactisthat the pressures
of today's highly technological a r m s race have taken the initiative and the
power to make the crucial decisions out of the hands of responsible government officials and placed it in the hands of technicians, planners, and scientists employed by vast industrial empires and charged with responsibility
for their employers' interests. It is their job to dream up new weapons
systems and persuade the military that the future of their military profession, as well a s the country, depends upon buyingwhat they have dreamed
up. They prosper personally and professionally, and their employers become industrial giants only if these weapons system scientists have lively
imaginations. Thus both the military men and their industrial counterparts
acquire a vested interest in ever larger defense expenditures, ever more
intricate and costly weapons systems, and ever larger weapons-producing
industrial combines. Without continuing growth and expansion, the dynamic
new industrial weapons companies could not develop and produce the deadly
and ever more elaborate weapons systems which their r e search specialists
a r e hired to formulate. And without such formulations the high brass of
the Pentagonwould soon lose confidence in their own profession. War today is a staggeringly futile and self-defeating busine ss. Once our weapons
development were halted, sanity would assert itself and pressures for a
roll-back of armaments would become overwhelming. Only by a constant
process of scrapping what has been produced and pressing on to produce
something better (that is, more lethal) can the military illusion be maintained among the generals and admirals (to say nothing of the population
a s a whole) that amilitary solution to our problems of security and survival is still possible in this nuclear-missile age.
For companies l i b General Dynamics, and for the generals and the
admirals on both sides of the contract negotiations table, secrecy, international tension, and avolatile weapons technology a r e the three pillars on
which their whole existence rests. Solong a s cold war fears a r e high, so
long as official secrecy forbids full revelationof the facts surrounding the
expenditure of vast sums on what the military and weapons manufacturers
privately agree is worth spending money on, so long as yesterday's failures and successes al&e can be swept into the dustbin of weapons obsolescence, just s o long can our garrison state economy churn its merry way.
This cango on so long a s the devices which the weapons manufacturers a r e
producing do not get put to actual use. When that happens it will be the end.
The garrison state economy is a weapons centered economy. Research,
development, and manufacture of weapons is the central dynamic that drives
our largest industrial combines around which all the other segments of the
economy a r e clustered, and upon which the health and growth of the rest
of the economy has come to depend. Weapons manufacturers do business
in ways that have little similarity to the normal conditions of peacetime
commerce.

a. The bulk of their business is with a single customer possessed of
an inexhaustible purse.
b. There is a nearly complete identity of interest between themselves
and agents of the customer with whom they do business; neither could
get along without the other.
c. They are not held to tight standards of quality and performance of product, but rather to alimitless capacity to think up new things to build.
d. Though they have easier access to the public purse thanhas ever been
known before inourhistory, they make no accounting which the public and its elected representatives can understand and evaluate.

There is little wonder that the stock market takes a nose dive every time
there is the slightest threat of disarmament and peace. Their whole multibillion dollar house of cards is threatened by every peaceful breeze.
Automation, which could be a healthy development and a great boon to
working people, is introduced rapidly and without necessary social controls. Even if the world were at peace and the arms race had never happened, modern technology would be producing new ways to manufacture
more goods with less expenditure of human effort. Developments in the
field of electronics mean that the machines of industry can now be operated,
corrected in their performance, and supplied with the parts and materials
they need, without large armies ofhuman machine tenders but by electronic
controls which, under the surveillance of a few trained technicians, operate more efficiently and at far higher speeds than the eye, mind, and hand
of a person. The development of the vast new productive capacities which
this makes possible has enormous potential for the well- being of mankind.
In a stable society, organized and balanced to permit all segments of the
society to have a fair share in the benefits of technology, automationwould
result in shorter hours of work, higher wages, more leisure time, and a
broad extension of opportunities for educational and cultural development
in an atmosphere of economic security. We could be knocking on the door
of man's ancient dream of peace and plenty. The necessary productive
capacities a r e at hand and they a r e being developed rapidly.
The realities of cold war, however, a r e quite different from the possibilities of a peacetime economy. Though automation i s being developed at
a rapid pace, the benefits to labor a r e strangely lacking. Indeed, instead
of benefit, there is injury. Jobs in basic industry a r e shrinking, even
though production remains stable o r goes up.

In December, 1958, automobile output was only four per cent less than
it had been in December, 1956, but there were 20 per cent fewer automobile workers employed. Between 1957 and 1958 telephones of the Bell
System in the United States increased 2.5 million, and there was a 4.4 per
cent increase in local phone calls and a 5.3 per cent rise
long distance
calls. Duringthe same period Bell System employment fell by 67,713, or
8.5 per cent below the 1957 figure.

During the 1958 recession steel production sagged to less than 50 per
cent of capacity. There was widespread unemployment in the steel centers.
Then, during the first six months of 1959, steel production rose rapidly as
the industry and its customers stockpiled steel in anticipation of a rnidyear steel strike. Even so, employment in April, 1959, was 35,000 less
than in the previous high production period of 1955, and it was even less
than in the depression year of 1937, when steel production was less than
half the 1959 level. During the 20 years 1939 1959 steel output per manhour rose 87 per cent. This spectacular rise in productivity, plus an extensive post-World War 11 development of new steel plants, has provided
the steel industry with production capacity substantially in excess of the
steel requirements of the economy. In early 1959 the steel industry began
an all-out push to produce and accumulate steel stockpiles in anticipation
of a mid-year strike. During the next six months enough steel was produced to last the American economy for ten months of what promises to be
a boom year.

-

According to a recent survey conducted by The Wall Street Journal (as
this is written the strike is in its seventh week) eventhe automobile industry reported enough steel in hand to last through two months of new model
production this fall. Still more recently the same newspaper, on August
26,1959, reported that warehouse inventories of steel had been only slightly
affected by six weeks of strike. Stocks had fallen from 3,700,000 tons to
3,125,000 tons. This meant that the steel-using industries had not yet had
to look beyond their own stockpiles for industrial steel.
What is true for the steel, automobile, and communications industries
is true for industry a s a whole. Since 1951 production of durable goods
has increased by 27 per cent, while the number of workers employed in
this production has dropped by more than half a million. No less an authority than Dun's Review said in July, 1959, "Current output exceeds that of
five years ago, although the number of production workers in manufacturing is down from 1954. "
The effect of this rising productivity and excess plant construction on
the bargaining power of labor ib obvious. Unemployment and partial employment, for example, has become chronic in the steel industry, except
for those short bursts of speed when an accumulationis being made to use
as a weapon against labor' at bargaining time.
Public subsidy of private industrial expansion through tax concessions.
The rapid and uncontrolled introduction of automation into American industrial life has been made possible by the public funds which the cold war has
made available to private industry in the form of tax concessions on the
rate of depreciation in value of new plants. Without going into the technicalities, it is sufficient to point out that in December, 1956, a staff report
of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue described the rapid depreciation tax schemes as "a form of special government assistance to private
manufacturers, or, bluntly, a subsidy.
As early a s 1951 the Dawson
Committee reported that rapid tax depreciation was "the biggest bonanza
that ever came down the government pike. And in December, 1958, The
Wall Street Journal reported that the rapid depreciation laws of 1954 were
Ifacting a s a great new source of capital funds.

In May, 1957, former Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey testifiedbefore the Senate Finance Committee that up to that time tax depreciation certificates had been issued for 22,000 construction and development
projects of private industry costing $39 billion. More than $5 billion in
withheld taxes was allowed. To make up for the loss of revenue caused by
these withholdings, Secretary Humphrey estimated that the government
would eventually pay $3 billion in interest costs.
A case in point is the great Fairless steel mill at Morrisville, Pa. According to a speech on the floor of the House of Representatives by Congressman Michael J. Kirwan, tax depreciation allowances on this one plant
totaled $450 million. This plant is probably the most modern steel producing facility on earth. It has added substantially to the excess steel producing capacity of the steel industry of the United States, acapacity which
i s now being used to teach the steel workers and their union a lesson in
the economics of cold war.

These schemes were originally adopted a s Dr. Win-the-War measures,
through which government secured the full cooperation of industry in war
production during the early days of World War 11. In 1950, when the Korean
war started, this subsidy program was revived, and it was carried over
into the post-Korean war period by legislation passed in 1954 by the 83rd
Congress. This legislation allowed depreciation provisions to apply not
only to defense industries, but also to non-defense industries.
Though these tax subsidy "war babies1' are justified on the ground that
new plants for private industry a r e necessary to keep America militarily
strong, they have beenused and are now being used to weaken labor's position. No matter what else may be shown by the steel strike of 1959, it
cannot be deniedthat the steel industry's capacity to make all the steel our
economy can use and yet stay shut down for months on end, is demonstrated
convincingly. Industry can hold no heavier whip over those whom it employs. Industry wouldnot have had this whip except for the tax concessions
justified first by hot war and then by cold war.
The administered price. Much was said during the 1958 recession about
the phenomenon of the administered price whereby prices a r e set not by
competition, but by affixing a profit margin over costs and pricing the individual items accordingly. This discussion still continues. Some deny
that there is such a thing as administered price. Others say that it is nothing new. Some say it i s economically desirable and others yearn for the
free market place where prices follow consumer demand.
Senator Estes Kefauver, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, has reported convincing evidence regarding administered price practices and the effect on labor both in time of depression and
in time of boom. Kefauver describes the administered price practices a s
a "restrictionist policy of modern big businessmen under which price increases are made in the face of falling demandand substantial excess capacity. w He comments, "A price policy which puts more money in the
pockeb of the producers while at the same time further depressing an already reduced level of demand and employment does not have much to commend it. "

As examples of how the policy works inpractice, Senator Kefauver has
cited the following:
(1)Inflated profits. In July, 1957, an adjustment in steel wages was
followed by price increases of steel. The wage boosts amounted to
$2.50 o r $3.00 per ton of finished steel. The price increase was
$6.00 a ton, more than twice the amount needed to cover increase
wage costs, Actually, other factors, such a s the falling price of
steel scrap on a declining market, were more than enough to offset
the cost of the wage increases to the steel companies, But prices
were boosted anyway, with the result that steel industry net profits
per ton hit an all-time high of $17.91 for 1957. This was an increase
of $3.45 per ton over the previous year and it touched off other price
rises throughout the economy.
(2) The elimination of price competition. When U. S, Steel raised its
prices in 1957 nearly all the other steel producers did the same thing
by exactly the same amount. This was explained by the industry a s
"meeting competition. '' At one point in the hearings conducted by
the Subcommittee, Senator Kefauver asked Mr. Roger Blough, Chairman of the Board of U. S. Steel, "Mr. Blough, do you regard it as
true competition when another company matches your price to a thousandth of a cent per pound, o r you match some other company's price
to a thousandth of a cent per pound? Wouldn't itbe more competitive
if there were at least some difference in these prices?"
,

Mr. Bloughreplied, "My concept is that a price that matches another
price is a competitive price. If you don't accept that concept, then,
of course, you don't accept it. "
(3) Price r i s e s in the face of falling demand. Senator Kefawer says that
the administered price industries work it both ways. If demand increases, they raise prices because of the ''pressure" of demand on
supply. If demand lags, "they raise prices because costs have risen,
a s overhead costs a r e spread over a smaller number of units." He
cites the statement of t$e retiring president of the American Paper
& Pulp Association in February, 1959, who said, "The nation's paper
makers will be forced to raise prices if operations continue to lag. "
Since lagging demand means decliningproduction and rising unemployment, a policy of administered prices means that profits continue to go up
a s the buying power of the wage earners and those on fixed incomes shrink.
According to the August 19, 1959, fact-finding report of Labor Secretary
Mitchell on the steel strike of 1959, the wage-employee labor cost per ton
of steel dropped from $47 in 1958 to $44 in 1959, while the realized price
per ton rose from $171 to $173 during the same period. Meanwhile, profits in all of industry were reaching new highs. According to The Wall
Street Journal, the corporate profits for the second quarter of 1959 achieved
"the largest gain for any three months, compared with a year earlier,
since this newspaper began compiling records for several hundred companies, quarter by quarter. f i Ananalysis of 428 companies showed second
quarter profits in 1959 jumping 75.6 per cent over the previous year. Leading participants in this profit-taking bonanza were automobiles with a 300

per cent increase in profits, steel with 163 per cent, mining and metals
with 123 per cent, railroads with 148 per cent, chemicals with 74 per cent,
and rubber with 64.5 per cent. Meanwhile, the situation of the unemployed
was far l e s s rosy. From a recession figure of 5.1 millions unemployed
in April, 1958, the figure had dropped to 3.6 millions in April, 1959. This
w a s still 900,000 higher than the pre-recession figure of 2.7 millions unemployed in April, 1957.
Industry is able to free itself from the controls of the market place and
write its ownprice ticket to the extent that there is concentration of industrial control, and access to huge resources insulated from the exigencies
of the free market. The cold war has accelerated monopolistic tendencies
and has supplied vast, market-free, financial resources, a s we have seen
above.
It is ~ r e c i s e l vin the industrial sectors where the cold war has its most
dirkct ties that ihe institution of the administered price is most deeplyentrenched.
- - - - - -- Gardiner Means. the father of the theorv of the administered
price, has charted U. S. price trends by industry from 1953 to 1957. During this period the industries which a r e still relatively remote from defense business, such as textiles, farm produce, lumber and wood, hides
and leather, and processed foods, were competitive and reacted to the r i s e
o r decline in demand. Prices in the mixed industries, where there is more
centralization but still no strong military influence, such a s fuel and power,
furniture, and chemicals, went up, but lesd than ten per cent. Prices in
the armaments producing sectors of the economy, including metal products,
machinery, automobiles, aircraft, missiles, etc., soared nearly 20 per
cent. This was in the teeth of a general market trend of lower consumer
demand. It could only have happened if the. industries involved were heavily
engaged in highly lucrative business which was far removed from the effects of the open market on prices. That precisely is the situation of the
large armaments producers, for it is they who get the bulk of the secretly
negotiated cost-plus defense contracts with their guaranteed high profits.
The tens of billions in defense contracts which a r e concentrated in the hands
of the large aircraft, electronic, shipbuilding and vehicle combines each
year a r e the backbone of the economic power that permits the power elite
of modern industry to raise prices as demand falls, and to ride out each
new recession confident that new weapons contracts, and new dreams of
super weapons on their drawing boards will stimulate ever larger defense
appropriations.
.

THE NEW POWER RELATIONSHIPS OF COLD WAR ECONOMICS.
Labor has its modern dream of an automated heaven where the old hobo
song about the big rock candy mountain will be realized in terms of a fourday or even a three-day week, with everyone able to own his own home,
car, and boat, send his kids to college, and retire while still young on a
pension of $400 a month. There is nothing wrong with this dream. It is
good. We ought to have it. The productivity of modern industry, and the
potentials just ahead bring such dreams into the realm of possibility for
all people everywhere. But the possible is not going to become probable
so long as the realities of economic power which a r e generated by the cold
war divert the attention of the people from their hopes to their fears and

rob them of the capacity to realize what their own abilities
reach.
The labor movement in the past has made substantial contr
realization of the dreams of workingpeople. The
ing and garment industry have been transformed by unions. The goon squad
practices of the automobile and rubber industries have been replaced by
collective bargaining. The terror imposed on coal miners and steel worke r s by the private industrial police of 40 years ago is now a nearly forgotten
chapter of history. These changes came because unions achievedpower and
used it in a responsible way. Today also there cannot be chaqges unless
there is a new acquisition of power by the people and a responsible use of
it in the interest of humanity. Automation maybe an instrument but it will
not be used for the good of society automatically.
The cold war has placed enormous economic power in the hands of a
small number of scientists, engineers, industrialists, and military men
who collaborate in private about how billions of dollars shall be spent on
weapons. Labor has little o r no part in their deliberations. It may be a
prestige factor for a labor leader to be taken on a highly confidential tour
of restricted weapons testing areas. But the basic decisions affecting the
economy a r e being made without labor being consulted.
The cold war has placed a large excess plant capacity in the hands of
private industry, and given industry power over labor in collective bargaining matters. To accept the conditions of the cold war is to accept the
system that creates the new power situation.

In 1958 a tragic accident took the lives of two civilian mechanics at a
Nike missile base in New Jersey. The widow of one explained why her
husband had requested a transfer from repairing automobiles to modifying
Nikes, saying, "We thought there would be more security in missiles because they seemed to be the coming thing. " In the big missiles tool-up
of 1959 the entire labor movement, and indeedour entire economy, is acting in the same way, and faces the same tragic possibility.
In many ways the cold war has served unions well. Their institutional
and financial situation is strong. They have more members than ever before. Strikes and bargaining may drag out, but usually there is no threat
of strike-breaking and no doubt about the end result, give o r take a little.
But so far a s participation in basic economic and political decisions is
concerned, the cold war has dealt the unions out rather than in. Today we
a r e told that we must make every sacrifice to catch up with Russia in missiles o r to keep pace with her nuclear development. But it is not clear who
will be asked to sacrifice what. The unions a r e supposed to sacrifice their
wage increases. The fixed ipcome people a r e supposed to tighten their
belts in the face of administered price increases. The farmers a r e urged
to sacrifice their parity protections. But what of the industrial giants and
the weapons systems makers? Will they sacrifice the cost-plus features
of their contracts 7 Will they forego their tax concessions ? Will their
directors and managers apply wage and salary restraint to themselves ?
Will they abandon their collaboration on prices and profits ? Let us be
realistic. Not so long a s they can help it; and, thanks to the power relationships of cold war, they can help it.

-

THE COLD WAR AND NATIONAL SECURITY
It is a tribute to the people of organized labor and to their leaders that,
generally speaking, individual or group interest is not the controlling
factor in deciding conduct or policy where issues of national security a r e
at stake. Even though it be true that the cold war works to the disadvantage
of labor, if it is also true that acceptance of the conditions of cold war is
a requirement of loyal and patriotic citizenship, there can be little doubt
what mostworking people and most unions would do. They would accept it.
Indeed, that is precisely what they have done for the past 12years and that
is what they a r e doing today.
But has the cold war actually strengthened us a s a nation and made us
more secure? That has been our declared purpose from the start of the
cold war. We have felt that our interests have been threatened by t h e
Soviet Union, and we have been told that we must wage the cold war to
achieve a position of strength so that we could deal with her effectively
and peacefully. The cold war has been our bid to win peace through
strength. That has been our purpose. But how has it worked out? Has the
cold war made us strong?
If weapons bring military security, we should be the most secure people
of all time. If we had had in 1941 the weapons we have today, World War
I1 could have been won in a week. At the end of WorldWar I1 we had blockbuster bombs which exploded with the power of ten tons of TNT. Today a
single H-bomb is two million times a s powerful a s one of those World War
I1 monsters, and we have them stockpiled in massive quantities.
At the end of World War I1 our submarines had practically wiped out
enemy shipping. Our submarine fleet was made up of conventional craft
which had to surface at. night to recharge their batteries. They fired torpedoes only slightly improved over the World War I brand. Today our
nuclear submarines can stay submerged for weeks at a stretch, and they
soon will fire missiles with nuclear warheads. In future war not only surface ships, but cities hundreds of miles from the sea will be easy submarine
targets. This will be true both of Russian and American cities, but Russian
cities a r e far from the oceans, while most of ours a r e on or near the sea.
At the end of World War PI massive fleets of long range bombers could
carry thousands of tons of explosives a thousand miles and drop them on
the helpless cities of the enemy. Scores of cities were wiped out. Today
the speed and range of these great ships have been doubled and trebled,
and we a r e now moving into the period when even the fastest and most
powerful bombers will be obsolete because intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of speeds of 18,000 mph will be on their launching pads,
ready to be fired at targets six or eight thousand miles away. These ICBM's
will carry H-bombs, each one of which has greater explosive power than
all of the bombs exploded in all of the wars from the beginning of time
down through the end of World War II! In another world war we must expect that nations will die.

Our weapons strength is enlarged by military pacts and alliances with
more than 40 countries which provide us with military bases located in a
vast global a r c encircling the communist countries, giving us the means
of attacking strategic targets quickly and from many directions.

In short, we have the weapons to destroy anything we want to, and to do
it quickly. Still we a r e not secure. Instead, a s our military strength has
grown we have become less and less secure.
These a r e the reasons:
1. The Problem of Soviet Power. The Soviet Union also has vastly
destructive weapons. Her bombs a r e a s big a s ours. Her bomber fleets
a r e a s fast and powerful a s ours. Her long range missiles a r e more powerful than ours and she reportedly is months or years ahead of us in
quantity missile production. Her submarine fleet is larger than ours, the
largest ever built. Missile experts say that even with a maximum effort
it would take us five years to catch up with Russia in missile production
and development, and they a r e not able to guarantee that we can do it even
then, for Russia may continue to move ahead a s rapidly a s we do.
2. The Nth Power. Problem. Soon, unless there i s a universal ban on
nuclear tests, instead of three countries possessing nuclear weapons,
many nations will have them. According to a recent report, 12 countries
not now possessing nuclear weapons will be able to produce their own
within five years. This will greatly increase the danger of war. Inter,national control of armaments and nuclear tests will become nearly impossible. The danger of irresponsible provocation will increase. Tottering
governments always a r e tempted to risk desperate adventures and ours is
a time of tottering governments.
3. War by Accident or Mistake. As missile weapons a r e developed
and deployed around the earth the danger of war being touched off by
accident or mistake will increase. Obscure soldiers in remote places will
be required to read their radar screens accurately and decide in minutes
whether to launch their missiles or hold fire. Time will be all-important.
Attacking missiles will reach their targets in a matter of minutes. Wild
geese, meteors, or orbiting spgce vehicles can be mistaken for attacking
missiles. Men under the strain and tension of having to make hair-trigger
judgments may suffer nervous collapse. A single mistake, a single lapse
of judgment by a missile launching control post can ignite the flames of
total nuclear war.

4. Suitcase Bombs and Sneak Attack. Nuclear scientists have declared that llsuit case missiles" may already be llplantedllin the cities
and the industrial areas of-the world. Highly portable "suit case" bombs
have been developed which explode with the force of thousands of tons of
TNT. An intransigent dictator of a small nation, with little to gain from
peace and little to lose from chaos, could plant a bomb and start a war.
A routine smuggling operation and a secondhand truck is all the organization and equipment he would need. It could be done in such a way as to
leave the victim country guessing a s to the true identity of the culprit.
War could come without anyone knowing who had started it. But that would
not make the initial blow any less terrible nor the ensuing war any less
devastating.

5. The Danger of Nuclear Tests. Even the developing and testing of
nuclear weapons is a hazard to world health both now and for generations
to come. Every nuclear explosion creates radioactive fallout. Some of the
radioactive materials a r e short-lived, but some remain active for months
or years. One of the most dangerous is strontium 90 with a half-life (the
length of time i t takes for half of its strength to rot away) of 28 years.
Strontium 90 is like calcium. It is taken up through the soil into the
grasses that cows eat o r it settles on the blades of grass after it has been
washed down out of the sky by rain o r snow. It gets into the milk and when
the milk is drunk the strontium 90, like calcium, is taken into the bones
and is accumulated and stored there, remaining radioactive for years.
Before the first nuclear explosion there was no strontium90 in our atmosphere, soil, or seas. Today, thanks to nuclear explosions, everyone on
earth has it stored in his bones. Children a r e affected more than adults
because their bones a r e growing. Just a s they require more calcium than
adults, so their bodies store more strontium 90 than the bones of adults
do.

Strontium 90 can cause leukemia and other forms of cancer. No one is
quite sure just how much strontium 90 it takes in a given instance to cause
leukemia, nor can any particular case be identified a s to the cause. Only
a small proportion of all leukemia is thought to be caused by nuclear fallout radiation. But leading scientists meeting a t Pugwash, Nova Scotia,
estimated in the summer of 1957 that the tests up to then would probably
cause 100,000 leukemia and cancer deaths before the radioactive materials
which had been released into the atmosphere would have rotted away. This
represents only a small fraction of a per cent of all the deaths due to cancer
that will occur during the next several generations. But a s Prof. Harrison
Brown of the California Institute of Technology has said, "We would not
dream of lining thousands of people against a wall and shooting them down
in order to test a new machine gun. But this in effect is what the U. S. ,
the U. S. S. R. , and the U. K. do when we test these fantastic new weapons. l f
Nuclear tests not only injure the present generation but also damage
babies yet unborn. Some of the rays caused by nuclear tests reach the
gonads and affect the genetic materials which a r e essential to human reproduction. Genetic mutations (changes in the reproduction cells) occur
a s a result. These mutations a r e usually harmful, causing either injury
or death. Even when genetic damage is slight, it is passed on from one
generation to the next, producing an accumulation of life damage through
many generations.
There is general agreement that the percentage of births affected by
genetic damage from fallout radiation so far i s slight. But the same
scientists who estimated that the nuclear tests conducted up to the summer
of 1957 would cause 100,000 cases of leukemia, predicted a like number
of deaths eventually from harmful genetic mutations caused by those same
nuclear explosions. Since that time our government has conducted extensive tests, both in the South Pacific and in Nevada, and Britain and the
Soiiet Union have engaged in somewhat fewer tests. These tests of 1957
and 1958have doubled the load of radioactive materials in the stratosphere.
This means that even more deaths from leukemia and genetic injury will
occur than was predicted at Pugwash two years ago.

Indeed, a s scientific knowledge is extended the warning of nuclear fallout dangers becomes more and more ominous. For instance, it was
learned in 1958 that each nuclear explosion (even including the so-called
"clean" H-bombs) releases carbon 14, a dangerous radioactive material
which attacks the chemical bonds of human cells. At first this danger was
minimized by the AEC and other supporters of nuclear tests. Today it is
widely accepted a s one of the most hazardous of the byproducts of nuclear
explosions. And in 1959 it was admitted by the AEC that radioactive
materials released by nuclear explosions return to the earth much faster
than had been thought. This means that the soil, vegetation, and animal
life of our world (that includes all of us) receive a heavier and a more
varied radioactive attack from the materials thrown off by nuclear explosions than previous calculations indicated.
Thus we live under two nuclear perils: swift destruction of all life on
earth from total nuclear war (there a r e some scientists employed by the
armed forces who claim it will not be all life but only one half or one
fourth!), and the slow radioactive contamination of the atmosphere from
continued and extended nuclear tests.
However, two reassurances a r e offered by those who still believe that
we must continue pursuit of the cold war arms race. First, they say that
wars can be limited to restricted areas and confined to the use of nonnuclear weapons and to smaller nuclear weapons. Second, they say that
the way to assure peace is to maintain a balance of power great enough to
deter any aggressor.
j

Let us examine both of these reassurances.
1. The Doctrine of Limited War

There i s no question that limited wars do occur in the atomic age. Not
every war blossoms into total war. Since World War I1 there have been
limited wars , o r wars that did not become unlimited, in Korea, Guatemala,
Greece, Hungary, Egypt, Algeria, Oman, Kashmir , Vietnam, Burma,
Malaya, Indonesia, Cuba, China, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Formosa Straits.
In most of these no dangerous threat of totalwar developed. But in several
there were days and weeks of great tension when almost anything could
have happened. This was true in Korea in 1950 and 1951, in Vietnam in
1954, in the Formosa Straits in 1955 and again in 1958, in Hungary and
Egypt in the fall of 1956, and in Iraq and Lebanon in the late summer of
1958.
In any one of these conflicts a single rash step by an over-eager soldier
or a political or military leader could have touched off World War 111.
General MacArthur wanted to attack China in 1951 but was restrained.
Suppose he had not been? Vice-President Nixon openly toyed with armed
intervention in Vietnam in 1954 but his suggestion was vetoed. Suppose he
had had his way? High military advisors urged punitive measures against
China in 1954, but President Eisenhower heeded more prudent voices.
Suppose he had been ill at the time? Britain, France, and Israel stopped
short and pulled back from Egypt in 1956 when they were confronted by
demands from President Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev. Suppose they
had plunged ahead?

If Syngman Rhee had had nuclear weapons in 1951 the chances a r e he
would have used them. If Chiang Kai-shek had them today, he might do
the same. How can anyone say that if we play the limited war game, limited war will never become unlimited? No one can give such guarantees.
total
It simply is not enough to show that limited wars happen.-en
war means total destruction it is necessary also to show that no limited
war will become unlimited. That is an assurance that the advocates of
preparations for limited war a r e unable to give. They fall back on talk
about calculated risks, but they do not tell us how they can calculate risks
which involve powers of destruction beyond calculation, and hatreds and
ambitions which, once released, quickly go beyond control. The hazards
of destruction become even less calculable a s nuclear weapons and missiles a r e stockpiled a t distant bases on the territories of foreign governments, many of which a r e frustrated, unstable, and given to noisy sword
rattling a s a cover-up for their own inadequacies.
2. Peace through Deterrence

As a corollary to hopes that wars can be kept limited there is the hope
that aggressors can be restrained through the deterrent power of threatened
retaliation. This means that we must protect ourselves from attack by
giving the potential aggressor the absolute assurance that he will be destroyed if he starts anything. But what if the enemy hits us s o hard in the
first blow that we cannot hit back? According to the analysis of the study
of the National Planning Association, 1970 Without Arms Control, "the
'push-button for the dead man's hand' sort of device is likely to receive
careful attention, Such a device could be set off by blast, heat, explosion,
o r radiation levels. " In other words, we would place our missiles in underground launching sites where they would be relatively immune to enemy
attack. Then, using automatic triggers which would not require a live
man's hand to set them off, we would live in the confident knowledge that
if the enemy at one blow wiped out our cities and killed us all, we would
still have our revenge even after we were dead, for our missiles would
be set flying toward his cities a s soon as the heat, the blast, o r the radiation levels from his bombs reached the triggering point. Revenge really is not the word. We would not set up this machinery hoping for posthumous revenge, but in order that the enemy would be completely convinced that he would be signing his own death warrant if he attacked us,
regardless of the success of his initial blow.
Surely if anything would deter an aggressor, this would be it. But will
it? Perhaps it would deter some aggressors and not deter others. Let us
take an example. Suppose we had our "dead man's hand" deterrence
perfected and Russia had hers. We would each be deterring each other.
If either fired H-bombs against the other both would die. But suppose some
discontented satellite o r ally, o r some erratically led neutral country decided that the world would be a better place without either Russia o r the
United States. What would keep such a country from smuggling a few Hbombs of the suitcase variety into strategic areas where they could be
fired? Then both the United States and the Soviet Union would automatically start killing each other off. The "dead man's hand" would pull the
trigger while men were still alive. The chances a r e , of course, that the

radiation caused by such a massive exchange of obliteration weapons would
kill everyone, including the inhabitants of the country that started it. But
that would not be certain, and even if it were, what might deter our enemies
might not deter our friends, among whom there a r e some not noted for
their reliability and devotion to the cause of democracy and freedom.
Today we have not yet reached the point of absolute threat of massive
retaliation. But we a r e in a transition stage of progress toward it, and
this itself is an exposed and provocative situation. Russia may not be s o
f a r ahead of us in missiles today that she could knock u s out without receiving heavy blows in return. But she soon may be f a r enough ahead to
expect to somehow survive a short, sharp war which would utterly destroy
us. If she sees the situation in this light, thinking only in t e r m s of the
military meanings of security, what is the prudent thing for her to do?
Should she strike and take her chances, knowing that delay may permit us
to catch up and possibly go out in front of h e r ? Or should she wait and
hope that the future will not reduce us both to the helpless condition of the
totally armed and the totally deterred? Whatwould we do if we had her in
such a situation of disadvantage? We once had her in something of that
situation when, at the beginning of the cold war, we had the A-bomb and
she did not. But we do not have her there now. If we should get significantly ahead of her again, would we dare run the risk a second time of
letting her try to catch up?
,

The above paragraph is written not for the purpose of saying what either
we o r the Russians would do in a given situation., but to point up the volatile nature of the cold war and to show that there is a s much in our a r m s
race to provoke attack a s to deter it.
A stable balance of power may well be a deterrent. But what we have
is something else. We have an unstable balance of t e r r o r combined with
constantly fluctuating relationships of power. This is dangerous in the extreme.
To go back to our first quest!on, has the cold war strengthened us and
made us more secure? According to some definitions it may have strengthened us. We can do far more damage today than we could 12 years ago.
But we a r e far less secure. Twelve years ago Russia was not capable of
destroying us. Today, probably she is. Twelve years ago we enjoyed exclusive possession of nuclear weapons. Today Russia has them too, and
she has missiles to deliver them which a r e several years ahead of ours.
Twelve years ago a massive attack upon our shores, either from the sea
o r the a i r was unthinkable. Today Russia has, o r is about to have, long
range missiles and missile launching submarines capable of deep penetrating attack on all our major cities. In short, the cold war has not
strengthened us. It has not made us more secure. We a r e in greater
peril than when the cold war began, and all the billions spent have produced a r m s which expose us and all humanity to perils greater than history has ever seen before.
The primary concern of organized labor in national security is not a
special o r class matter, but a concern which working people share with
the r e s t of the population. Labor must always be willing to submerge her

special interests where the national interest requires it. Labor has supported foreign policy duringthe cold war and has supported national leadership in its efforts to achieve a position of strength. But patriotism does
not require support of a course which has been tried and has failed. It is
not loyal to remain silent a s we move inexorably toward final disaster.
It is good citizenship to dissent boldly when continued assent means destruction.
The missiles which the working men and women of the United States and
the Soviet Union a r e manufacturing today will soon be stored in handy stockpiles o r poised on launching pads. When they a r e fired they will streak
through outer space at 18,000 miles per hour. Their targets will be the
cities and the industrial areas where the working men and womendotheir
jobs, live their lives, and provide their children with whatever security
life in this century is able to offer.
History tells us that a r m s races end in war, that huge stores of deadly weapons a r e finally used. Yet this could be a time of greater security
than man has ever known. The cold war has done more than produce
weapons of mass destruction. By pouring many hundreds of billions of
dollars into a r m s it has denied to the people of the earth a chance to
enjoy what, after many centuries of human effort, mankind a t last has
learned to produce.
There is no security in cold war, but only ever greater hazard. When
workers a r e told to sacrifice their economic powers for the sake of the
security the cold war can bring to the nation, they a r e really being asked
to sacrifice their owninterests in the pursuit of a course which has led us
ever deeper into a r e a s of deadly peril.

r
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THE COLD WAR AND WORLD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Has the cold war strengthened our efforts to promote world economic
development? Americans a r e like millionaires surrounded by slums.
There is a relationship between economic well-being and political stability. We cannot have political stability if we grow richer while our neighbors
go hungry. The best safeguard against dictatorship is prosperity and democracy. Communism is really three things. It is a power system. It
i s an idea. And it is a system of organizing the productive capacities of
people. People who a r e submerged in poverty and see no hope in their
situation turn to communism, not because they want to lose their freedom
but because they know nothing about freedom. They have never had it.
They a r e not interested in the freedom to go hungry. From the very beginning of the coldwar we have spent money and skill helping underdeveloped countries learn to help themselves. The aim has been to provide an
economic base for freedom and democracy.
The need is great. The billion o r more people who live in Southern
Asia, Africa, and Latin America have an average per capita income of
l e s s than $80 per year. In many of these lands there a r e vast differences
in income. ASaudi Arabianprince gets millions from oil revenues but his
nomad tribal kinsman will have nothing. AnIndian merchant, manufacture r , or ex-maharajah may enjoy an income running into hundreds of thousands of rupees but the average Indian industrial worker earns between
30b and 6 5b a day, depending on the place and the kind of work. And there
is an astronomical gap between the income of an African tribesman and a
prosperous European settler.
Poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, and disease go together. In much of
Asia and the Middle East illiteracy runs 80 percent o r higher. The minimum daily food requirement to maintain health and decency is 2500 calories, but in the underdeveloped countries the average person gets only 2000
calories or less. In some countries, such a s India and China, the population a s awhole has hovered at the borderline between mild malnutrition
and actual starvation for genenations.
Life expectancy inthe United States i s about 70 years but in the underdeveloped countries it averages about 30 years at birth. The availability
of doctors and the skill and trainingpf doctors varies widely. In the United
States there is a doctor for every 750 people. In India the ratio is one to
In some countries the situation is even worse.
6000 people.
These conditions had remainedvery much the same for a hundred years
prior to the end ofworld War 11 when there began to develop a stirring and
a discontent. During the past 1 2 years most of Asia has won political independence. Africa is now in the midst of political revolution and counterrevolution. In Latin America the dictators a r e being unceremoniously
tossed out of their armed nests Nationalism is running like a tide through
the Middle East.

.

The people of all of these lands want two things. They want a better
life, and they want respect.
Economically their new governments' common problem is to accumulate capital goods (plants, roads, factories, mines, transportation and
harbor facilities, etc. ) and to achieve a system of production and distribution which will hold the loyalty of, and give work incentive to, the people.
The effect of China on the r e s t of Asia is not to be discounted, nor should
we forget that our strong support of Chiang Kai-shek in the cold war provides the Chinese Communist leaders with a convenient "hate" symbol to
use in stimulating their people to ever greater efforts. People who have
lived under the economic and political dominance of foreigners for more
than a century, suddenly find they can move ahead despite strong foreign
opposition. What could stimulate them more? While we huff and puff to
keep Chiang Kai-shek in power on Taiwan, the communist leaders of China
use our cold war efforts to strengthen themselves. If jiu-jitsu is turning
the strength of the opponent against himself, this is political jiu-jitsu.
Elsewhere we have been persuaded by cold war rivalries to put military
aid far ahead of economic aid. Duringthe first 11years following the end
of World War I1 we provided aid totaling 57 billion dollars to other countries. Half of that amount ($28,400,000,000) went to help war-ravaged industrial countries restore their industrial and economic life. Thirty-two
per cent ($18,000,000,000) went for military equipment which we distributed among the 40 odd nations with which we have had military pacts. Of
the remaining 18 per cent, $3,500,000,000 went for relief to refugees and
other war victims, $3,800,000,000 providedeconomic assistance to main
defense- support countries*, including Korea, Formosa, and Indo-China,
and the remaining $3,300,000,000 (six per cent of the total) was distributed a s economic assistance among 75 underdeveloped countries with a
total population of 1,150,000,000 people. $53,700,000,000 on wars, past,
present, and future, and $3,300,000,000 on non-defense economic aid; that
is how our aid program has been apportioned. The people of the underdeveloped countries not holding military alliances with the United States
got, on the average, 26b each per year. Our per capita aid to the people
of the defense support countries was seven times a s much.
This policy of heavy emphasis on guns and bases, while the economic
needs of the people a r e neglected unless there is military alignment, has
had the following results:
1. Our actions have spoken louder than our words. People of other
lands simply do not believe us when we claim our aid has "no strings attached. "
2. For the sake-of military pacts we have supported dictators who have
used our trade and aid to suppress rather thanencourage democratic government s and, incidentally, to keep themselves in power.

*

Defense support countries (12 at present) receive extra economic help
to buttress their political and economic stability in the interest of undergirding their military pacts with the United States.

Examples include:
(a) Saudi Arabia. Here a handful of wealthy sheiks reap enormous
wealth from U. S. oil, trade, and aid while the people live in poverty. The
price of slaves in Saudi Arabia has gone up a s oil revenues have mounted
during the past ten years. When a strike occurred in Saudi Arabia at an
American-owned oil refinery in 1953, it was ruthlessly suppressed. Martial law was declared because the workers were said to be demanding wage
increases. According to a press report of the International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions: "500 workers were imprisoned, 80 of whom were
poisoned with scorpionsand subjected to burning, pulling out of nails, and
other forms of torture. "
Two years later our government was discovered to be shipping tanks to
Saudi Arabia. When friends of Israel protested, the U. S. State Department explained that the tanks were not to be used against Israel but to maintain "internal security. " It was not explained how the use of tanks for
this purpose would serve democracy. It is not surprisingthat the oil sheiks
of the Arabiandesert would need tanks to protect themselves against their
people. But it is a sad commentary on the cold war when the United States
uses it as an excuse for acting a s an arsenal of this brand of "desert democracy. "
@)Korea. According to the cliches of the cold war, the mantle
of the "free world" is draped around Syngman Rhee. We fought a "limit+
edppwar and spent billions of dollars to protect freedom and democracy in
Korea, but all we have accomplished is to keep Rhee in power. Rhee has
proved to be tyrannical and ruthless. He suppresses newspapers which disagree with him. He uses his police force to bully the legislature into passing laws which wipe out civil rights. He openly threatens war against North
Korea. And his strong-arm led trade unions a r e instruments to control
industrial workers rather than represent their interests.
(c) Franco's Rule of Spain. Internal unrest and opposition to
Franco has grown during the past decade but he has managed to maintain
power with the help of U. S. military aid. At the end of World War 11 we
wanted no part of Franco, but our desire for military bases changed things.
Today he is our ally in the cold war. His methods of control have not
changed. Newspapers a r e still suppressed. Freedom of worship is still
denied. Political dissent is driven underground. Trade union rights do
not exist, Anyone who protests is jailed.
(d) The list could be extended to include Chiang Kai-shek, the now
departed Bao Dai, and such Latin American dictators and ex-dictators a s
Batista and Trujillo, to say nothing of the last vestiges of colonial rule to
which our European allies cling in Africa.

In all of these our cold war commitments have driven us to side with the
forces of dying tyranny rather than with the hopes of those who sacrifice
for a brighter day.
3. Because some countries have refused to enter military pacts 'with
us, we have let democracy flounder in crisis areas. The prime example

is India. Indiarepresents the last major democratic opportunity in Asia.
If she abandons democracy there will be no place else of size and importance in Asia to give i t a try. Yet instead of extending all-out aid to her
economic development we have been carping and niggardly because she refused to join our ring of military alliances. Meanwhile countries that have
given up on democracy, o r have never tried it, get all the dollars they
want.

During the three years 1954-56 U. S. aid went to the following countries
as indicated:

Country*

Population
(millions)

Total
economic
aid
(million $) **

Aid
received
per capita
per annum

India
South Korea
Formosa
Pakistan

*

South Korea, Formosa, and Pakistanhave military pacts with the U. S.
India does not.

** These figures do not include military aid.
4. Military pacts with one country have stimulated military expenditures
in neighboring countries where every cent is needed for economic development. Again with India, half of her budget goes for arms. She justifies
this on the ground that the a r m s we supply Pakistanthreatenher. We may
deplore this reasoning but the fact remains that U. S. a r m s to Pakistan
mean fewer tractors, factories, and irrigation projects for India. It is no
validation of India's fears to point out that they a r e characteristic of the
a r m s race atmosphere, and in fairness she deserves credit for her persistent refusal to accept a cold war alignment.
5. Cold war rivalries for markets and economic penetration between the
two world giants, the United States and the Soviet Union, set economic
competition at a level which the underveloped countries cannot possibly meet. Until the newly independent countries are able to develop industrially, they will need tariff and other protections against the competitive power of the Western industrial countries. Such protections will not
be possible in an atmosphere of cutthroat economic competition between
the United States and the Soviet Union. The more the Soviet Union challenges us in foreign trade the l e s s willing we shall be to permit Asian goods
to compete on the American market.
The cold war has been a period of economic difficulty for the underdeveloped countries. India has had to cut back on her development plans.
Most of the new governments of SouthernAsiahave turned from representative leadership to military strong men in an effort to maintain national
unity in a period of growing economic crisis. In Latin America the wise-

spread discontent with our cold war economic policies has found expression
in such ugly incidents a s mob assaults on the American vice-president.
The cold war has magnified rather than solved the economic difficulties
of the underdeveloped areas of the world. OnlyinChinaare there reports
of rapid and confident progress. Our emphasis on spears rather than
plowshares, on building military bases rather than combating hunger and
poverty, has caused confidence in America to dwindle, and despair to mount
over our failure to come to grips with the real issues. The people of those
lands do not want preachments about freedom, nor military equipment and
bases, but food, clothing, work, and a better life. They a r e willing to
work for it but they need intelligent help.
Has the cold war strengthened our efforts to promote world economic
development? The answer is that it has not. It has diverted foreign aid
into unproductive and wasteful channels. Economic aid to underdeveloped
countries has been the cow's tail and military aggrandizement has been the
cow. The reach of working people of Asia and Africa for a better life and
human dignity has exceeded their grasp. Thwarted by petty strong men
and military governors kept in power by U. S. supplied arms, they a r e
beginning to despair of finding a democratic answer for their economic
problems.
The trade unions of America a r e expressing dismay a t the quantity of
consumer goods on the American market whichwere manufactured in other
lands by workers paid starvation wages. What can be done to halt the corhpetition of sweat shop goods from overseas? Talk of quota systems and
higher tariffs is self-defeating. The very countries against which such
measures would need to be most stringently applied a r e the same countries
which we cannot afford to offend for reasons of cold war military alliances.
Even if restrictions could be made effective they would be shortsighted and
ultimately disastrous, for the world of privilege cannot be hedged off from
the world of need. The only r e a l answer is an all-out attack on the conditions which produce the sweat shops in the first place, a renewal of that
spirit which opposes all special privilege and accepts the challenge of
identification with the needs, the aspirations, and the rising expectations
of working people everywhere t
In the realm of foreign policy we need to ask ourselves how such a
spirit can find expression in concrete policy. Can the trade unions become means whereby the ideals of brotherhood and justice may be applied
to policies of trade, aid, and cultural exchange among the nations?

IV
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
It is not the purpose of this pamphlet to offer pat answers but rather to
raise a warning about continued reliance on military solutions for economic
and social problems both a t home and abroad. We hold that no solution can
be found which ignores the following facts:
1. The first need is for the trade unions and the working people to face
the fact that the cold war has not worked out. Democracy has not been
strengthened, neither has the Soviet Union nor China been contained. A
position of strength has not been achieved. We a r e in greater danger than
we were when the cold war started. And there is no indication that this
situation will change, It will grow worse if the cold war continues.
2. The second fact which must be faced is that nearly a billion people
a r e governed bv communist r e a m e s and this situation shows no sign of

3. Third. the real test of democracv todav is not whether we can make
mo&ins
o> destructive weapons but whethe; the people of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America can find the rgad toward a better life within a framework of democracy. If not, all of the weapons in the world will not save
democracy. If they can and do, democracy will have a place in the world's
future, and the world will have a future.

4, Fourth, threats, hostility, and cold war drive communist countries
into tight alliances and stimulate their r e ~ r e s s i v tendencies.
e
In that they
a r e n 2 unlike us. But relaxationof tensiins can offer opportunities. ~ f l
t e r all, no state, no matter how hard it tries, can ever be completely
monolithic. The Soviet Union has tried to crush religion but crowds of
people still openly attend services of worship. It has tried to crush critical thought, but there is still apasternak. It has tried to adhere to a rigid
doctrine but it has been driven to make revisions and changes. What has
changed already can be changed still further.
5. Fifth, this is not the first time that vast ideological warfare has been
waged, yet people have been able to compose their differences and live in
the world with each other. Today there a r e no holy wars between Christians and Islam, though once each considered it good in the eyes of God to
kill the other. There is not such vast difference between East and West
today that we must resort to mass suicide.
6. Last, any course we take will involve risks. There is no foolproof
way to disarm, but neither is there a foolproof way to pursue an a r m s race.
There is no foolproof way to stop nuclear tests, but neither is there any
safe way to continue them. There a r e no foolproof, built-in guarantees
that if we trust Russia our trust will not be betrayed. But neither is there
any likelihood that we shall avoid disaster if we a r e unwilling to run a few
r i s k s for the sake of peace.

A cold war which drags out and becomes chronic may provide briefly
a precarious base for wage increases, but it destroys labor's dream of a
peaceful and productive world, and thereby strikes a heavy blow at the
greatest treasure labor has, the treasure of an ultimate ideal.
We have come too far toward disaster to save ourselves by half measures. The hope that we can keep on building more missiles and more
bombs and, at the same time, winthe cold war on the economic front is a
false hope and will betray us as every other cold war hope has betrayed us.
The only way out is to turn from cold war and start buildingaprosperous,
democratic world.
At the beginning of this pamphlet we asked whether labor should support

a new foreign policy.
The old foreign policy has failed the American people and it has failed
the people of organized labor in the following particulars:
1. It has deliveredpower over the economy into the hands of the Pentagon and those who make the decisions in the larger corporations.
2. It has projected us into rapid technological change without adequate
social controls.
3. It has crippled both labor and the consumer in the exercise of their
rightful economic powers in the market place.
\

4. It has exposed the people of the world to radioactive poison.
5. It has magnifiedthe destructive powers of war and brought war perilously close.

6. It has delivered us into the embrace of irresponsible allies, and
alienated our natural friends.

7. It has stimulated the harsh tendencies of the communist countries
and silenced voices of moderation.
8. It has diverted funds and energy from the constructive tasks of world
development into military build-ups which a r e irrelevant to the needs of
the underdeveloped lands.

9. It has degraded our moral purposes.

If enormous sums of money and effort go into means of mass annihilation, we may say it serve8 democracy, but actually it does not. Democracy
becomes corrupted a s human life becomes cheap. Everything comes under
the shadow of destruction and fear. Humanity loses its confidence in its
own purposes and even in its own chance to survive. It is not a mere coincidence that the crusading spirit and idealism of the New Deal period
began to drain out of the union movement as the economy began to shift
over and adapt to the requirements of war. Now the ethics, the immorality, and the cynicism spawned by the cold war have lowered the morale
and also the power of the trade unions.

The cold war is a burden on the back of labor. Unions will resume
their rightful place of leadership in American life only as instruments of
justice in a world of peace.
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